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Both the literature and new empirical evidence show that exchange rate regimes differ
primarily by the noisiness of the exchange rate, not be measurable macroeconomic fundamentals.
This motivates a theoretical analysis of exchange rate regimes with noise traders. Thepresence of
noise traders can lead to multiple equilibria in the foreign exchange market. Theentry of noise
traders both create and share the risk associated with exchange rate volatility. In such circumstances,
monetary policy can be used to lower exchange rate volatility without altering macroeconomic
fundamentals.
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Why are floating exchange rates so volatile?
In making his celebrated case for flexible exchange rates, Friedman (1953)
argued:
"...instabilityof exchange rates is a symptom of instability in
the underlying economic structure. A flexible exchange rate need
not be an unstable exchange rate. If it is, it is primarily because
there is underlying instability in the economic conditions...
Friedman's argument is that exchange rate instability is a manifestation of
economic volatility. Exchange rate regimes differ in the mechanisms through
which this underlying volatility is channeled. For instance, "liquidity" shocks
may affect the nominal exchange rate if the latter floats, but the money
supply if the rate is fixed. Underlying systemic volatility cannot be reduced
by the regime, only channeled more or less efficiently. The economy can
be thought of as a balloon; squeezing volatility out of one part (e.g., the
exchange market) merely transfers the volatility elsewhere.'
How then to explain the volatility of floating exchange rates? Flotations of
fixed exchange rates should lead only to temporary increases in exchange rate
turbulence, so long as the underlying economic volatility does not change.2
But for over a decade economists have known that exchange rate variability
is much higher in fixed exchange rate regimes than in floats; we provide
references and more evidence below.
In theory, exchange rate variability could vary with the exchange rate
regime because of variations in underlying fundamental economic volatility.
After all, the exchange rate regime is chosen by the policy authorities. Unfor-
tunately, there is remarkably little evidence of a systematic relationship be-
tween the exchange rate regime and macroeconomic phenomena. A number
of researchers have shown that the variability of observable macroeconomic
'Much of the argument here is common with Flood and Rose (1998).
2ft is thus unsurprising that many were surprised and struck by the magnitude of the
increase in exchange rate volatility rates following the shift towards generalized floating
in 1973, e.g., Mussa (1979) or Obstfeld (1995). Indeed, much of the most influential work
in international finance during the 1970s and 1980s was geared towards rationalizing the
apparently high level of floating exchange rate volatility; Dornbusch (1976) is a classic
example.
1variables such as money, output, and consumption do notdiffer systemati-
cally across exchange rate regimes; again, we provideevidence below.
Simply put, countries with fixed exchange rates haveless volatile exchange
rates than floating countries, but macro-economieswhich are equally volatile,
at least to a first approximation. This finding is inconsistentwith theories
which model either a) the exchange rate, or b) the exchange rate regime as
manifestations of underlying economic shocks. It is therefore unsurprising
that both classes of theories work badly in practice. Theformer has been
well known at least since the work of Meese and Rogoff (1983).But the
latter is the focus of this paper. Not only do macroeconomicmodels have
no predictive value for floating exchange rates, theycannot even explain the
difference in exchange rate volatility between fixed and flexible regimes.
This set of observations motivates our paper. Our objective is toestablish
and account for the stylized fact that exchange rate volatilitydiffers systemat-
ically across exchange rate regimes in the apparentabsence of corresponding
differences in macroeconomic volatility. We are interested in developing a
theoretical framework which can rationalize this phenomenon.
How can one model exchange rate regimes without relying on (non-
existent) differences in macroeconomic fundamentals?Since the only obvi-
ous cross-regime difference is in the behaviorof the exchange rate, we focus
our attention on the structure of the foreign exchangemarkets themselves
Our main theme is that a theory of exchange rate regimes cannot ignore
the micro-structure of the foreign exchange market. Ratherthan assume
that it is exogenous, we endogenize the structure of the markets.Of course,
since monetary policy lies at the core of any theory ofthe exchange rate
regime, macroeconomic fundamentals cannotbe ignored altogether. What
is required is an integration of a micro-structural theoryof market volatility
and a macroeconomic theory of exchange rate determination.In this paper
we provide an example of such a theory.
To develop a formal theory we need to give content to thenotion of mi-
crostructure of the foreign exchange market. Themodel that we propose
is based on "noise trading", that is trading based on whims,fads and non-
fundamental influences. We make a distinction between foreign exchange
markets where a large fraction of traders are noise tradersand those where
noise trading is absent or negligible. We identify the microstructureof the
market with the composition of the pool of foreign exchangetraders who
operate in the market. Exchange rate volatility, as aresult, has two compo-
2nents: fundamentals and noise. The size of the second component depends
on the structure of the market.
To show that the exchange rate regime affects the presence of noise
traders, we compare two stances for the monetary authority. In a "target
zone" the monetary authorities commit themselves to maintain the volatil-
ity of the exchange rate below a reference value. In a pure float, by way
of contrast, monetary policy is set independently from developments in the
foreign exchange market. We demonstrate that a pure float may give rise to
multiple equilibria.3 In particular, there is sometimes an equilibrium with
low exchange rate volatility and a low number of noise traders, which ex-
ists along with a high exchange rate volatility equilibrium with many noise
traders. Since these equilibria exist for the same level of "fundamental"
macroeconomic volatility, our model is able to rationalize the stylized fact
which macroeconomic models cannot. The reason behind the multiplicity of
equilibria is that in equilibrium, noise traders tend to cluster in the same
markets, as is standard in many models of noise trading (e.g., Admati and
Pfleiderer, 1988). The entry of noise traders in the market for a particular
currency changes the structure of risks and returns in a way that makes it
more attractive for other noise traders to join. This results in herd-like be-
havior in the migration of noise traders across markets, although their entry
decisions are individually rational.4
A target zone makes it possible to pin down the economy on the equilib-
rium with low exchange rate volatility. A target zone implies a commitment
to make monetary policy responsive to the entry of noise traders in the
foreign exchange market. The monetary authorities offset any increase in
exchange rate volatility induced by the arrival of noise traders, by reducing
the volatility of monetary fundamentals. This effectively insulates exchange
rate volatility from potential changes in the structure of the foreign exchange
market. By discouraging the entry of noise traders, the potential for multiple
equilibria disappears and the economy stays at an equilibrium with low ex-
change rate volatility. Thus, the mere promise that the authorities will react
to the entry of noise traders, if it is believed, suffices to keep noise traders
3The multiplicity of equilibria is also a feature of Flood and Marion (1996) and Flood
and Rose (1998), who use a more primitive stochastic portfolio-balance model with a
regime-varying risk premium and homogeneous agents. See also Hau (1998).
4The decisions of noise traders whether or not to enter a particular market are rational
in the sense that they are made on the basis of utility maximization.
3away.
De Long et. al. (1990) first formalized noise trading in a purely domestic
context. A few papers have subsequently introduced noise trading in the con-
text of foreign exchange.5 Mark and Wu (1998) make some progress on the
forward discount puzzle by investigating uncovered interest parity in a model
with noise traders. Faruqee and Redding (1999) show that the entry of liq-
uidity providers can accelerate the reversion of the exchange rate towards its
fundamental value in an environment with noise traders. A closer precursor
to our paper is Hau's (1998) analysis of the free entry of traders with noisy
expectations into a foreign exchange market. Hau finds that temporary noise
may result in higher exchange rate volatility and multiple equilibria as we
do, but abstracts from explicit consideration of macroeconomic or monetary
policy. More generally, these papers do not share our focus on exchange rate
regimes.
The paper which is closest in spirit to our analysis of target zones is
Krugman and Miller (1993). Krugman and Miller argue that the real poi-
icymakers' motivation in instituting target zones is the hope that they will
protect their currencies from pure speculative movements that are not related
to the fundamentals. They show that a target zone may reduce exchange rate
volatility in a model with stop-loss traders.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 below, we present the styl-
ized empirical facts of macroeconomic volatility and exchange rate regimes.
We show that standard macroeconomic models cannot be used to under-
stand the data. We then proceed to the core of the paper in section 3, which
presents a model of the foreign exchange markets with an endogenously de-
termined number of noise traders. We use the model to analyze monetary
policy, and discuss the relevant empirical evidence. The paper concludes
with a brief summary and suggestions for future research.
5There is a related literature which examines the (de-)stabilizing nature of speculation
in foreign exchange markets which does not involve noise trading. For example, Carison
and Osler (1997) show that rational speculation can be destabilizing. Frankel and Froot
(1990)arguethat feedback trading rules can increase exchange rate volatility.
42 A Macroeconomic Mystery
We have two objectives in this section of the paper. First, we establish one
stylized fact. We show that exchange rate volatility varies systematically and
dramatically across exchange rate regimes, while observable macroeconomic
volatility does not. Second, we show that macroeconomic models cannot
allow one to understand this finding.
The main purpose of this paper is to provide a theoretical framework
consistent with stylized facts, rather than to establish the latter with new
empirics. Consequently, we are at pains in this section to show that our
interpretation of the data is consistent with existing work and is not partic-
ularly sensitive to measurement issues. We use a variety of sources from the
literature to support our case. The evidence is univariate and multivariate,
structural and non-structural, and exploits differences across both countries
and time.
Mussa (1986) established convincingly that nominal and real exchange
rate variability varies substantially and systematically with the exchange
rate regime. Mussa used bilateral dollar exchange rates for a variety of
industrial countries from 1957 through 1984. He showed that the variance
of real exchange rates was an order of magnitude greater in the floating
period aftertheBretton Woods period, than it was during the Bretton Woods
regime of pegged rates.6 In his comment on Mussa, Black (1986) argued that
"empirical workers in the field of exchange rates will not regard this as new
information" and cites work which precedes Mussa's.7 Mussa's evidence is
especially convincing to us for two reasons. First, it is essentially undisputed,
at least to our knowledge. Second, the objective of Mussa's paper is unrelated
to ours: Mussa was interested in rejecting exchange rate models with flexible
prices.
Baxter and Stockman (1989) extended Mussa's work on exchange rates
to other macroeconomic variables. Using data for a variety of OECD and
developing countries, Baxter and Stockman examine the variability of out-
6Mussa's "first important regularity" is "The short term variability of real exchange
rates is substantially larger when the nominal exchange rate between these countries is
floating rather than fixed."
7Certainly Stockman (1983) provides consistent evidence earlier. See also Aliber (1976)
and other references given by Black.
5put, trade variables, and both private and government consumption, using
different de-trending techniques. They are "unable to find evidence that the
cyclic behavior of real macroeconomic aggregates depends systematically on
the exchange-rate regime. The only exception is the well-known case of the
real exchange rate."
The evidence presented by Mussa, Baxter and Stockman is compelling,
but incomplete. It relies on differences in the behavior of individual countries
across time. Time-specific effects may confound such empirical work. Exam-
ining the behavior of a cross-section of countries during a single time-period
is a way to check the stylized fact for consistency, and is also of intrinsic
interest. Further, the analysis is univariate. Models which link changes in
exchange rate volatility explicitly to changes in macroeconomic volatility are
potentially useful adjuncts, since the latter effects can be potentially subtle
and difficult to uncover with univariate techniques. Most importantly, it is
oniy by using macroeconomic models that we will be able to reveal their
inability to explain the phenomenon with which we are concerned.
These objections have been addressed by the work of Flood and Rose
(1995). They begin with the conventional monetary model of the exchange
rate. A simple money market equilibrium is posited in the domestic "center"
country, linking the natural logarithm of the money stock (m) deflated by
the (log of the) price level (p) to the interest rate (i) at a point in time t; the
same condition characterizes the foreign country (denoted with an asterisk).
Prices are assumed to be perfectly flexible, and purchasing power parity is
satisfied at all times so that the (log of the) price of foreign exchange (e) is






—mfl+ (t —i). (4)
The model's ability to explain exchange rate volatility can be tested by
comparing the characteristics of the left- and right-hand sides of equation (4).
6Figure 1 contains quarterly time-series evidence on Deutschemark exchange
rates from 1959 through 1996 for twenty OECD countries; this represents
the left-hand side of equation 4. Comparable evidence for the right-hand
side is portrayed in Figure 2; we use Ml and short maturity money market
interest rates, and a consensus estimate from the literature for the interest
semi-elasticity of money demand (unity) 8,9
Themessage from the two figures is straightforward. Consistent with
Mussa's finding, Figure 1 shows that nominal exchange rate variability is
low when exchange rates are fixed (in the 1960s or for strict EMS peggers
like Austria and the Netherlands), and high when exchange rates float. But
macroeconomic fundamentals (as dictated by equation (4)) do not exhibit
regime-varying volatility in Figure 2.
Comparable cross-section evidence is available in Figure 3. For each of
the twenty countries, the standard deviation of the exchange rate (estimated
for each country over time) is graphed against the standard deviation of the
right-hand side of equation (4). For generality, we use the United States in
place of Germany as the reference country. There is again no evidence of any
clear relationship between macroeconomic and exchange rate volatility. 10
Itmight be objected that the empirical rejection of equation (4) is hardly
surprising since it is derived from assumptions, in particular instantaneous
PPP, that are notoriously rejected by the data. The main result, however,
turns out to be very robust to changes in model specification. For instance,
Flood and Rose (1995) extend the model to include the effects of sticky
prices, real income, random shocks, and a variety of other issues without
changing the results. The intuition behind this insensitivity is simple: such
extensions simply make the right-hand side of equation (4) more complicated
combinations of money, output, interest rates, and prices, and lags. Flood
and Rose found that they could not match the volatility characteristics of
8The data set is taken from the International Monetary Fund's International Financial
Statistics CD-ROM, and has been checked for errors. It is available as a STATA data set
at http://haas.berkeley.edu/ arose.
9Flood and Rose (1995), show that the argument holds for a very wide range of rea-
sonable parameter values.
10These ocular results can be verified more formally with statistical tests, as in Flood
and Rose (1995). For instance, the regression slope for the data portrayed in Figure 3 is
slightly negative with a t-statistic of 0.1.
7exchange rates to those of structural economic fundamentals, even allowing
for stochastic structural disturbances. In particular, traditional economic
fundamentals of structural models do not have the regime-varying volatility
needed to match the regime-varying volatility of exchange rates. Where
Flood and Rose provide structural evidence across time for a number of
countries, Rose (1994) provides comparable cross-country data, with similar
results.
3 A Micro-Structural Theory of Exchange Rate
Regimes
The analysis in the preceding section makes us pessimistic about the ability
of purely macroeconomic models to explain regime-varying exchange rate
volatility. An alternative strategy is to consider models where the structure
of the foreign exchange market changes with the exchange rate regime.
The model we present mixes elements from two hitherto disparate branches
of economic theory, the macroeconomic theory of exchange rate determina-
tion, and the noise trading approach to asset price volatility. As in chemistry,
we make the experiment illuminating by combining two components which
are as pure as possible. Thus, we pick simple conventional building blocks,
uncontaminated by tangential complications. On the macroeconomic side,
we use the conventional monetary model of the exchange rate, augmented by
portfolio considerations. On the micro-structure side we employ the model
of noise trading developed by De Long et al. (1990). As shown above, the
macroeconomic part of the model performs poorly by itself. We now show
that one can improve the fit of the model by, paradoxically, adding noise.
In the model we present, exchange rate volatility has two components:
macroeconomic fundamentals and noise which is unrelated to fundamentals.
The size of the noise component is endogenously determined; it depends
on the decisions of noise traders who decide whether or not to enter the
foreign exchange market. Their decisions to enter depend in turn, on the
volatility of the exchange rate and the risk premium on foreign bonds. Thus,
monetary policy determines the exchange rate not only directly, by changing
the relative money supplies, but also indirectly, by affecting the composition
8of the foreign exchange market.
3.1 Macroeconomic Fundamentals
We continue to maintain (1)-(3), so that simple monetary equilibria hold
and purchasing power parity is satisfied continuously. We further assume
that the domestic country is in a steady state with constant money supply,
interest rate and price level. Hence the expression for the exchange rate can
be re-written dropping the time index for domestic variables:
et=(m—m)+c(i—ifl. (5)
We initially assume that the difference between domestic and foreign
money supplies, m —m,follows a stochastic i.i.d. normal process centered
on zero. This variable will assume the role of economic "fundamentals" in
the remainder of the analysis.11 For the moment we assume that this policy
variable is exogenous, as would be appropriate if the exchange rate floats
freely. We relax this assumption when we consider official exchange rate
policy below.
The interest rate is determined by equilibrium in the international bonds
market. We assume that investors in the international bonds market care
about the return of their portfolio measured in terms of domestic currency.
The domestic currency may be viewed as the international currency which
serves as the standard of comparison in evaluating portfolio returns.'2 In-
vestors are risk averse and require a risk premium to hold bonds denominated
in foreign currency.
The quantity of foreign external liabilities results, in equilibrium, from
the foreign current account and the balance of payments. These external
'1Since we maintain this structural equation throughout our analysis, our model cannot
rationalize the Flood-Rose (1995) mystery discussed above.
12lmplicitly we think of the domestic country as large and the foreign country as a
small open economy. One could make the model more symmetric by assuming that some
investorscare about their portfolio returns in terms of foreign currency, or that all investors
evaluate their returns in terms of a currency basket. This would make the risk premium on
foreign currency denominated bonds lower in equilibrium, but the essential properties of
the model would remain the same. Note also that one does not need to make the distinction
between nominal and real returns in terms of domestic currency since the domestic price
level is constant.
9liabilities may take the form of bonds denominated in either currency. The
supply of bonds denominated in foreign currency results from the foreign fis-
cal and monetary authorities' actions, in particular the respective shares of
domestic- and foreign currency-denominated bonds on the asset side of the
central bank's balance sheet. We assume hereafter that the foreign author-
ities maintain the supply of foreign currency denominated bonds, expressed
in terms of domestic money, at a constant level .Thisassumption is made
for the sake of analytical convenience, and can be relaxed without changing
the thrust of our results.13
3.2 Micro-Structure: Trading Behavior
Foreign exchange traders are modelled as overlapping generations of investors
who live for two periods and allocate their portfolio between domestic and
foreign one-period nominal bonds in the first period of their life. Traders have
the same endowments and tastes, but differ in their ability to trade in the
foreign bonds market. Some of them are able to form rational expectations
on risk and returns costlessly, while others have noisy expectations and must
pay an entry cost to invest in foreign bonds. We refer to the former as
"informed" traders and the latter as "noise" traders. Noise traders trade on
the basis of fads which are unrelated to fundamentals; informed traders do
not (though they have no special information advantage). Noise traders also
have higher costs of market participation than informed traders.
At each period the new-born traders form a continuum of measure 2
je[0, 2]. Each individual trader jreceivesan endowment of W units of
domestic currency. She then decides whether or not to enter the foreign
bonds market. We denote by 6 the dummy variable characterizing the entry
decision of trader jattime t; it equals one if she enters, zero if not. Traders
enter the market for foreign bonds if this increases their utility. Trader j's
entry decision is taken before the time t monetary policy shock is revealed,
on the basis of the information available at t —1:
13Sorne assumption is needed, since there is no natural way to endogenize the currency
composition of the foreign country's external debt. The assumption we make has the ad-
vantage of keeping the model simple. It would not be very difficult to consider alternatives,
such as a stochastic supply of foreign currency denominated bonds.
10Vj, t57 = 1E_,(U15=1) ￿E_,(U =0) (6)
where U is the utility of a new-born trader jattime t, and the expectations
operator bears the trader's index to allow for heterogeneity (the expectations
operator without index denotes the rational expectation)
A trader who has entered the foreign bonds market invests b in foreign
bonds so as to maximize the expected utility of her end-of-life wealth, ex-
pressed in terms of the domestic currency. We assume that trader j's portfolio
allocation problem at time t is:
max1,jUj' =E(_exp(_awi)) (7)
whereW1 is the end-of-life wealth of trader j.Itis given by:
T473 —1 W t+i— +1 tPt+i
—
Traderj's end-of-life wealth is equal to the trader's initial endowment
times the yield of domestic bonds plus, if jenters,the excess return on
foreign bonds minus a fixed cost that must be borne in order to enter the
foreign bonds market. The excess return on foreign bonds between t and
t + 1 is given by:
pt+i=i+(et+,—et)—i (9)
The cost c3 reflects the costs associated with entering the foreign market
for trader j.'4Weassume that foreign exchange traders are heterogeneous
with respect to this cost.
There are two types of traders: informed traders, located in the inter-
val [0, 1], and noise traders, in (1,2]. Informed investors have an accurate
knowledge of the way the exchange rate is determined, and bear no entry
cost.15 They are knowledgable about the economy, can process new informa-
tion costlessly and make their decisions on the basis of rational expectations
about the future. Thus, for j E [0, 1] one can write:
'4These costs are much discussed in the literature, and may include informational prob-
lems, taxissues,and other phenomena. There is no presumption that they are small,
given the size of the "home market effect"; Lewis (1995) provides a survey.
15The assumption that informed investors bear no entry cost stems from our desire to
focus on the entry decision of noise traders. It would not be very difficult, however, to




whereE(p+1) and Var(pt+i) are the expected value and conditional vari-
ance of the excess return on domestic bonds as evaluated by trader jat
period t, and E(p+i) and Vart(pt+i) are their mathematical counterparts.
Noise traders, by way of contrast, have imperfect knowledge of the de-
terminants of the exchange rate and bear a positive entry cost. We adopt
the (standard) assumption that noise traders perceive the second moment of
returns correctly, but allow their perception of first-moments to be affected
by noise that is unrelated to economic fundamentals.'6 The noise is com-
mon across traders; there is no private information in the model. Moreover





whereis the unconditional mean of the excess return (or average risk pre-
mium) and the noise term Vtisa stochastic i.i.d. normal shock common
across janduncorrelated with m. We interpret the noise term as a fad
which is wide-spread but non-fundamental. Unlike De Long et al. (1990),
our noise traders do not make systematic errors in their prediction of excess
returns.
We link the size of noise traders' errors to economic uncertainty by assum-
ing that the variance of the noise is proportional to the true unconditional
variance of the exchange rate:
Var(u) =AVar(e) (16)
16For evidence of bias in exchange rate expectations, see Frankel and Froot (1987).
12where A is a positive coefficient. (Assuming that Var(v) is constant is less
plausible; this would imply, for example, that noise traders expect the ex-
change rate to be stochastic when it is in fact constant.)
3.3 Equilibrium
An equilibrium in this model consists of stochastic processes for the exchange
rate {et},therisk premium {pt}, and individual traders' decision rules {5}
and{b},suchthat at each period t, 6 satisfies the entry condition (6), bis
the solution to the optimal portfolio allocation problem (7),andthe market
for domestic bonds is in equilibrium:
=fbdj. (17)
This equilibrium appears to be difficult to determine, since it involves
entry decisions by a continuum of heterogeneous agents in a stochastic en-
vironment. However, we exploit the assumption that the monetary shock
is independently and identically distributed, which suggests that the set of
equilibrium individual decision rules takes a simple stable form.
We solve the model with a "guess-and-verify" technique, first postulating
its properties, then checking that they are satisfied. We conjecture that:
(i) the fluctuations of the exchange rate are identically and independently
distributed around an average level
(ii)all informed traders, and a constant number of noise traders, ri,enter
the foreign bonds market at each period.
We characterize the equilibrium by proceeding in two steps. First, we
determine the equilibrium exchange rate, taking the number of noise traders
in the foreign market as given. We then endogenize the number of noise
traders by using the no-entry condition.
3.4 Analysis with an Exogenous Number of Noise Traders
In equilibrium the foreign interest rate and the risk premium are identically
and independently distributed around average values that we denoteand
13p respectively. The average risk premium is equal to the average difference
between the foreign and domestic nominal interest rates:
(18)
which, taking the expectation of equation (5), implies:
(19)
A rise in corresponds to an appreciation of the foreign currency. Equation
(19) says that a higher average interest rate differential, by decreasing the de-
mand for foreign money relative to domestic money, leads to the depreciation
of the foreign currency.
The risk premium is determined by equilibrium in the market for bonds
denominated in foreign currency. If the excess return on these bonds is
normally distributed (which is true in equilibrium, as we show below), it
is well-known that maximizing (7) is equivalent to maximizing the mean-
variance objective function:
E(W1) —Var(W1) (20)
and the demand for bonds denominated in the foreign currency by an indi-
vidual trader is given by:
=E(p+1)
(21) aVat(Pt+i)
Theequality of demand and supply in the bondsmarket implies:




where n is the number of noise traders investing in the domestic bonds mar-
ket. Taking the expectation of (22) at t —1then gives an expression for the
average risk premium:
14= aBVar(e). (23)
The average risk premium is increasing with the variance of the exchange
rate, the coefficient of absolute risk aversion and the quantity of bonds per
trader. We can then derive the equilibrium exchange rate by substituting
the definition of pt+iinto(22) and using (5) to substitute out the interest
rate differential, which gives:
rn—rn' a et—= + rwt. (24) 1+a 1-Fa
This expression confirms that the fluctuations of the exchange rate are i.i.d.
normal in equilibrium.
Taking the variance of (24) and using (16) to substitute out the variance
of the noise allows us to close the characterization of equilibrium with an
expression for exchange rate variability:'7
Var(m —m*) Var(e) = (25) (1 + a)2 —
Thevariance of the exchange rate depends on fundamentals and noise.
The fundamental component is proportional to the variance of money supply.
The novelty in this model is the noise component, which is proportional to
the square of the number of noise traders active in the market. An exogenous
increase in the number of noise traders unambiguously increases the variance
of the exchange rate, which tends to raise the risk premium. On the other
hand, it also increases the total number of traders demanding foreign bonds,
which lowers the risk premium. That is, noise traders have two counter-
acting roles in our model; they both a) create risk and b) share risk. As a
result, the impact of the extra noise traders on the equilibrium risk premium
is non-monotonic. The ambiguous effect of noise trading on the risk premium
is portrayed in Figure 4. This ambiguity —thefact that the risk premium
can be decreasing or increasing with the number of noise traders —liesat the
heart of our model.18
17Note that this expression yields a positive value for the variance of the exchange rate
for all n E[0,1] if )..< (1+ a)2/c2, a condition that we assume satisfied thereafter.
18Figures 4-8 were obtained for the following values of the parameters: c =1,a =4,
=3,B =1,and y =0.3.The variance of relative money supply, Var(m —m*),was set
153.5 Endogenous Entry
We now endogenize the composition of the pooi of active traders.
The entry decision for informed traders is trivial: they bear no entry cost
and always enter the foreign bonds market in equilibrium. However, a noise
trader enters only if the benefit of diversifying her portfolio into foreign bonds
exceeds her cost of entry. We show in the appendix that this condition takes
the form:
GB(p,Var(e)) ￿ -y (26)






Thepartial derivatives of equation (27) have an intuitive interpretation. The
benefit of entry, as assessed by noise traders, is increasing with the risk
premium and decreasing with exchange rate variability. But in equilibrium
both the risk premium and the variance of the exchange rate are functions
of the number of noise traders that enter the foreign bond market; this can
be seen in equations (23) and (25). This circularity, as we now show, can
generate multiple equilibria.
We illustrate our result in Figures 5-7. These show the net benefit of
entry for the marginal noise trader, for three different levels of the variance
of (monetary) "fundamentals" •19Thebenefit depends on the number of noise
traders, n, as well as the impact that these noise traders have on exchange
rate variability and the risk premium, Var(e) and .
Figure5 portrays a low level of fundamentals variance. It shows that
the only possible equilibrium is one in which noise traders do not enter the
foreign bonds market. The variance of macroeconomic fundamentals is so
low that the benefit of entry is always negative for the marginal entrant,
however many noise traders are present.
Figure 6 is the more interesting case; it portrays an intermediate level
of fundamental variance. There are two stable equilibria in this scenario,
to 1 in figure 4.
'9Var(m) was set to 0.5, 1.5 and 2.0 in Figures 5, 6 and 7 respectively.
16corresponding to points A and C (point B is unstable). Point A corresponds
to an equilibrium with low exchange rate volatility and a low risk premium.
Here, the foreign market does not offer noise traders a large enough gain to
induce many of them to enter. But there is another equilibrium at point C,
which corresponds to a high volatility, high risk premium equilibrium. In this
equilibrium, more noise traders are attracted to the foreign bonds market by
the high risk premium that they themselves generate by entering the market.
Thus, our model can generate different levels of exchange rate volatility for
the same level of macroeconomic volatility. We can rationalize the stylized
fact which motivated this paper by simply labeling point A a "fixed exchange
rate regime" and point C a "floating exchange rate regime".
Figure 7 is symmetric to Figure 5; fundamental volatility is so high that
there is only one equilibrium with high exchange rate volatility and noise
traders present.
Figure 8 portrays the relationship between the variance of fundamentals
and exchange rate volatility. The lower branch corresponds to equilibria
in which noise traders do not enter the foreign markets (or only a small
number of them do); the higher branch to equilibria with entry; and the
branch in the middle to unstable equilibria. If the variance of fundamentals,
Var(m —m*),is below a threshold there is a unique equilibrium as in Figure
5; noise traders stay away from the foreign market. If this variance is above
a much higher threshold, the equilibrium is again unique since noise traders
always enter (the Figure 7 case). In between the two thresholds there is
a "zone of multiplicity." If the variance of fundamentals falls inside this
intermediate range there are two stable equilibria. One has low exchange
rate volatility and limited entry of noise traders; the many noise traders who
are present in the other make the exchange rate more volatile.
Under a pure float, hence, there is no simple relationship between the
volatility of monetary fundamentals and the exchange rate. Two countries
with similar fundamentals may exhibit radically different levels of exchange
rate volatility. In the high volatility equilibrium, exchange rate volatility is
"excessive", in the sense that it is higher than the level that can be ascribed
to the traditional macroeconomic fundamentals. This excessive volatility can
be eliminated with a policy which switches equilibria, as we now show.
173.6 Exchange Rate Policy
The purpose of this section is to analyze policies that reduce exchange rate
noise. These policies work by allowing the policymaker to co-ordinate activity
to a low volatility equilibrium. We consider an exchange rate "target zone,"
following Krugman and Miller (1993).
Krugman and Miller argue that the main cost of floating exchange rates,
as perceived by policy-makers, is that they leave currencies vulnerable to
purely speculative price movements that are unrelated to fundamentals. They
interpret a target zone as a mechanism designed to reduce exchange rate
volatility by limiting the impact of these non-fundamental influences. Our
model is well suited to a discussion of such issues.
Suppose that the foreign monetary authorities wish to implement the
following monetary process:
m-m=ñ2t (28)
where isan exogenous i.i.d. normal process.2° In the absence of noise
traders, this process implies the following exchange rate process:
- Lnlt
(29) 1+c
This monetary regime can be characterized in two ways. Either the mone-
tary authorities can announce a) that the money supply will fluctuate around
a constant level with a given variance [Var(ñi)], or b) that the exchange rate
will fluctuate around its mean with a given variance [Var(ë) =Var(zñi)/(1 +
)2].Weidentify the first type of announcement with a floating exchange
rate and the second with an exchange rate target zone.
In the absence of noise traders, it does not matter whether the mone-
tary regime is expressed in terms of the money supply or the exchange rate.
Since these variables are linked by (29), specifying the process for {ni}is
equivalent to specifying the process for {t}.
Thingsare different in the presence of noise traders, at least in the zone of
multiplicity. Suppose that Var(Lñit) is in the range where multiple equilibria
can arise. From Figure 8 we know that the monetary process is consistent
20We take this process as given. Our model does not allow us to derive the optimal
policy rule from primitive policy objectives such as output stabilization, given its lack of
nominal frictions.
18with both a low exchange rate volatility equilibrium (point A) and a high
exchange rate volatility equilibrium (point C). That is, specifying a monetary
process leaves the composition of the foreign exchange market indeterminate
and allows for multiple equilibria. Taking the monetary process (28) as an
exogenous policy variable means that noise traders may rationally decide to
enter the foreign market. If enough of them enter, the economy winds up
at the high volatility equilibrium. Benign neglect of the exchange rate can
result in excessive volatility.
A solution to the multiplicity problem is to announce an explicit objective
of limiting the fluctuations of the exchange rate —atarget zone. Suppose that
the monetary authorities announce that they will implement the exchange
rate process {}irrespectiveof the entry of noise traders. That is, the
authorities commit themselves to the following money supply process:
m—m——(1+a)(et—)—-cnvt. (30)
This announcement, so long as it is credible, keeps noise traders away and
pins down the economy on the equilibrium with low exchange rate volatility.
This is because the exchange rate variance and the risk premium resulting
from (29) are those that prevail in the low volatility equilibrium; they make
noise traders prefer to stay out of the foreign bonds market. Such a target
zone involves no sacrifice in terms of macro-fundamentals. Given that n =0
in equilibrium, the money supply is in each period exactly at the level desired
by the monetary authorities. There is a free lunch of exchange rate stability.
This policy analysis begs the question of why any country should care
about exchange rate volatility at all. Our model has been kept highly styl-
ized; it abstracts from country size, openness, and the nominal frictions that
make exchange rate policy decisions non-trivial. Still, our main result —that
reducing exchange rate volatility may not involve any sacrifice in terms of
monetary autonomy —shouldremain valid in more complex models with
nominal stickiness. This violates Mundell's "Incompatible Trinity" of fixed
exchange rates, monetary autonomy and capital mobility. A threat by the
monetary authority (to react if noise traders enter) changes the composi-
tion of the market. By discouraging the entry of noise traders, the market
is steered to a low volatility equilibrium where intervention is unnecessary.
Words speak loudly enough that actions are unnecessary.2'
21By picking out a single equilibrium, the expectations "honeymoon" offered by the
193.7 Empirical Evidence
It is difficult to provide direct empirical support for our model. While it
is possible to estimate exchange rate volatility and risk premia, there are
few data available on foreign exchange trading volume. Information on dis-
aggregated trading activity is even more rare.22 These would be critical com-
ponents of any serious test of our theory. However there are a few suggestive
pieces of evidence which support our argument.
One key part of our model is the prediction that an increase in trading
volume is associated with an increase in the level of exchange rate volatility,
since the increase in volume comes, at the margin, from noise traders. To
our knowledge, there are only two sources of data on exchange rate volume;
both have problems.
The Chicago Mercantile Exchange has data series on volumes of trade in
their futures markets. However, there are problems with the data set. First,
it only includes futures market volume, ignoring spot markets, options and
other derivatives. Second, the rates are all bilateral dollar rates. Third, there
are gaps in the series. Fourth, there are only a limited number of currencies
traded on the markets. Bearing these caveats in mind, it is still instructive
to examine the data set.
As our regressor we use annual data on CME trading volume for the
years 1973 through 1989.23 These are available for the following currencies
(vis-a-vis the American dollar): (British) pound sterling; Canadian dollar;
(German) DM; (Italian) lira; (Japanese) yen; (Mexican) peso; Swiss franc;
(Dutch) guilder; French franc; and Australian dollar. As our regressand, we
use annual exchange rate volatilities, the estimated standard deviation of the
first-difference in the natural logarithm of the monthly exchange rate (using
the IFS end-of-month exchange rate series "ae"). We use non-overlapping
monthly data to arrive at a single estimate for annual exchange rate volatility.
We are left with a panel of annual data (spanning year and exchange rates).
exchange rate target zone in our model is stronger than in Krugman's (1991) model, where
the exchange rate is stabilized by the promise of interventions that have to be fulfilled in
equilibrium.
22lndeed, dis-aggregated data on trading activity is non-existent over any reasonable
span of time (e.g., a year).
23Futures trading began in the middle of 1972 and a continuous data set covering the
period after 1990 is not currently available to us. Some of the currencies were not traded
throughout the entire period, so that we have 129 annual observations.
20A simple OLS regression of exchange rate volatility on volume yields
a positive slope coefficient (as predicted) which is insignificantly different
from zero at conventional levels (the robust t-statistic is 1.5). However, as
our model shows, exchange rate volatility and volume are simultaneously
determined, making OLS an inappropriate estimator. As an instrumental
variable, we use the natural logarithm of distance between the USA and the
foreign country. This variable is suggested by the literature on the "grav-
ity equation" of international trade. In our data set, distance is correlated
with volume (the slope coefficient is 4) and thus is an admissible instrumen-
tal variable. When we compute IV estimates, the slope coefficient in our
volatility/volume regression remains positive, and grows in both size and
statistical significance; its t-statistic is 2.9. That is, greater exchange rate
trading volume is associated with more exchange rate volatility, as our model
predicts. This panel evidence twins well with the case study of the Tokyo
foreign exchange market by Ito, Lyons and Melvin (1998) which found that
extra trading was associated with higher exchange rate volatility.
The Bank for International Settlements collects data on a wider range
of foreign exchange products, including spot trading and most derivatives.
However, these data are broken down into only a few bilateral markets, and
only for trades involving either the dollar or DM. Further, these data are
currently only available for 1992 and 1995. Thus, we are unable to perform
a regression analysis. Still, there is some evidence that increased volume is
associated with greater exchange rate volatility. The 1996 survey shows that
the vast majority of foreign exchange transactions occur between floating
exchange rate regimes; only one of the top ten exchange markets was a fixed
rate.24 The 1993 survey shows that of the top thirteen foreign exchange mar-
kets, only two were for fixed exchange rate regimes.25 Again, this evidence
is consistent with our model.
There are a few other pieces of support for our approach. In their survey
of market practitioners, Cheung and Wong (1998) show that most traders be-
lieve that non-fundamentals are of pervasive importance in foreign exchange
markets, especially in the short run. Market practitioners also believe that
increased speculation raises both volatility and liquidity. Flood and Rose
24Table F-4 indicates that the DM/FFr rate was in seventh place in terms of volume in
April 1995
25Tables 2-B and 2-C shows that the DM/Pound market in sixth place in terms of
volume, while the DM/FFr rate was in eleventh place
21(1996) find that deviations from uncovered interest parity (often interpreted
as risk prernia) are much smaller under fixed exchange rate regimes than
in floating rate regimes, again consistent with our model. Mark and Wu
(1998) also make progress in the same area using a model which relies on
noise traders. Rose (1996) finds that our model's focus on stated exchange
rate policy and the violation of the "Incompatible Trinity" twins with the
OECD data; Evans and Lyons (1999) show that the order flow which lies
at the heart of most micro-structure models is an important determinant of
exchange rate movements.
Individually, none of these pieces of evidence is convincing. Jointly, we
think of them as weak corroboration of our model, and a strong encourage-
ment, to us and other researchers, to develop new data sets. A more definitive
test awaits better data.
4 Conclusion
Floating exchange rates tend to be volatile; fixed exchange rates are not.
Does the volatility in floating rates get transferred to another part of the
economy when rates are fixed? No. To a first approximation, countries with
fixed exchange rates have less volatile exchange rates than floating countries,
but macro-economies which are equally volatile.
This well-known finding is inconsistent with theories which model the ex-
change rate regime (or the exchange rate itself) as a manifestation of under-
lying macroeconomic shocks. Unsurprisingly, such theories have performed
poorly when applied to the data
In this paper we have presented a micro-structural model which canbe
used to understand exchange rate volatility in floating exchange rates. Our
model introduces noise traders, who create exchange rate volatility if they
choose to enter the foreign exchange market in order to diversify their portfo-
lios and buy foreign bonds. Noise traders benefit from holding foreign bonds,
but pay a cost from entering foreign markets while also creating undesirable
exchange rate volatility.
For a range of fundamental macroeconomic volatility, our model generates
multiple equilibria; the noise traders can either be present or absent from the
markets. If they are present, they generate exchange rate volatility; we think
22of this as being a floating rate regime. But there is another, "fixed rate,"
equilibrium without noise traders and with a more stable exchange rate.
With a suitable policy stance, the policy authorities can coordinate activity to
this equilibrium. In fact, an appropriate exchange rate target zone can lower
exchange rate volatility without any macroeconomic cost at all. Since the
policy reduces exchange rate volatility by ensuring that the fixed exchange
rate equilibrium is chosen, reducing exchange rate volatility is costless in
our model. Exchange rate policy works by affecting the composition of the
foreign exchange market, not by the traditional mechanism of subordinating
monetary policy to an exchange rate target.
Our micro-structural model of exchange rate volatility is extremely styl-
ized and unable to capture many aspects of reality. But, as we have shown,
much more complicated macroeconomic models are even less capable of ra-
tionalizing the facts. Our model has not been directly validated with any
empirics. Still, we think of it as a useful new theoretical starting point to
investigate exchange rate volatility.
23APPENDIX
This appendix derives the net benefit of entering the domestic market for
noise traders (equation (27)). We first state the following lemma.
Lemma. Consider the stochastic variable p = + €i + E2 where €i and €2 are
independently and normally distributed, centered on 0, of variance a and
o respectively. Denote U =— exp(—abp).Then:
E (maxE(Ulfi)) =-exp (2(a( )
(31)
Proof. We proceed backwards, computing first E(U€i), maximizing over
and taking the expectation over c. First, we make use of the identity:
abp+ (32)
to compute a closed-form expression for E(Uki):
1+00 1/e\ E(Uki) =— jexp(—abp) ,__exp—----i i—co V27ru2\ 2aj
/(_ a2 \\ [+00 1/(aob+c2)2'\ =exp—abp+c1——a2bjj/ r—exp(— 2 2iii—co V27r02\ 2a2j
=exp(_ab(+€i—b))
(33)
as the integral on the right-hand side of the second equation is equal to unity
(it is the integral of a normal density function).
Maximizing the quadratic function of b that appears in (33) then gives:
maxE(Ujci) =-exp((+€i)2)
(34)
We then take the expectation of this expression over fi:
24E (maxE(UIE1)) = exp((±€i)2)
exp(-a)
dE1. (35)
Using now the decomposition:
(+ ci)+ 4 2+(E + 2P)
(36)
2o2 2u12(1 +2) 2a1a2
1
itis possible to compute the closed-form expression for (35), which is (31).
Q.E.D.
Letus consider now the entry decision of noise trader j at time t. Without
entry, trader j's expected utility is given by:
E_1 (u =o) = — exp(—a(l + i)W). (37)
while under entry it is given by:
E_1 (u =i)=— exp(—a(1 + i)W + a-y)
E1(max E (—exp(—abpt+i)
At the time of her entry decision, noise trader jdoesnot know what her
expectation of the excess return will be after entry. However she knows that
this expectation will be given by E Cot+i)=+ u, where Vt is normally
distributed with variance o, and that the innovation in Pt+i at t + 1 will
be normally distributed with variance Var(e). In other terms, at the time of
entry the excess return Pt+i is expected by the noise trader to be of the form
+ Vt + with17t"-i N(O,Var(e)).Applying the lemma then gives:
E_1 (u =i)=
_exP(_a(1+i)W+:7)V(()
exp(- . (38) \2(Var(z)+ Var(e)))
25It follows from the comparison of (37) and (38), and the identity Var(v) =
AVar(e),that trader j's utility is higher under entry ff1:
<1. (39)
Taking the logarithm of this inequality then gives (26).
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